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Abstract 
 
In this paper we use data on five social inclusion indicators (poverty, inequality, unemployment, 
education and health) to assess the performance of 15 European welfare states (EU15) over a 
ten-year period from 1995 to 2004. Aggregate measures of performance are obtained using 
index number methods similar to those employed in the construction of the widely used Human 
Development Index (HDI). These are compared with alternative measures derived from data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) methods. The influence of methodology choice and the 
assumptions made in scaling indicators upon the results obtained is illustrated and discussed. 
We also analyse the evolution of performance over time, finding evidence of some convergence 
in performance and no sign of social dumping. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Union has adopted an interesting and intriguing approach to achieve 
some kind of convergence in the field of social inclusion. This approach is known as the 
"Open Method of Coordination" (OMC).1 This method requires the definition of 
common objectives and indicators, which are then used to identify best practice 
performance. Member states thus regularly know how well they are performing relative 
to the other states. The implication being, that if a particular state is not performing as 
well as some other states, it will hopefully be pushed by their citizen-voters to improve 
its performance.2 
Thanks to the OMC, a variety of comparable and regularly updated indicators have been 
developed for the appraisal of social protection policies. In this paper we focus our 
attention on five of the most commonly used indicators, which relate to poverty, 
inequality, unemployment, education and health. The definitions of the indicators that 
we use are listed in Table 1. Furthermore, the values of these indicators for 15 European 
member states3 are listed in Table A1 in the Appendix for the 10 year period from 1995 
to 2004. If we look closely at the 2004 scores in this table it is evident that some 
countries do well on some indicators but not on others. For example, Spain has a good 
health indicator but a very bad poverty indicator, while for Luxembourg it is the 
converse.  
Thus, when comparing country A with country B, we are unable to confidently say that 
A is doing better than B unless all five indicators in country A are better than (or equal 
to) those in country B. To address this issue we could attempt to construct an aggregate 
indicator of social protection. Perhaps we could use methods similar to those used in 
constructing the widely used Human Development Indicator (HDI)?4  That index 
involves the scaling of its three composite indicators (education, health and income) so 
                                                          
1 The open method of coordination is a process where explicit, clear and mutually agreed objectives are defined, after 
which peer review enables Member States to examine and learn from the best practice in Europe. Commonly agreed 
upon indicators allow each member state to find out where it stands. The exchange of information is designed with 
the aim of institutionalizing policy mimicking. (see Pochet, 2005). 
2 OMC is related to yardstick competition. See on this Schleifer (1985). Yardstick competition is a method to 
overcome the information problems or the monitoring restrictions of the authority (here the European Commission). 
It rests on comparative welfare evaluation. Accordingly, each national government would exert more effort in order 
to enhance their performance relative to their neighbours. The discipline effect of comparative performance 
evaluation is expected to generate a sort of "yardstick competition" among national governments, with politicians 
mimicking the behavior of nearby governments. 
3  These are the 15 European Union members prior to the enlargement of 2005. 
4 See Anand and Sen (1994). 
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that they lie between zero and one, where the bounds are set to reflect minimum and 
maximum targets selected by the authors. The HDI is then constructed as an equal 
weighted sum of these three scaled indicators. 
In this paper we wish to construct an aggregate index of social protection, so that we 
can address questions such as “Is country A doing better than country B?” and “Is 
country A improving over time?”. Various choices need to be made regarding the 
methods we use. First, should we use a linear aggregation function as is used in the 
HDI?  Second, how should we scale our indicators – especially those indicators where a 
higher value is bad (e.g., unemployment)?  Third, should we allocate equal weights to 
each of the five indicators?5  If not, how should we determine the weights?  Should it be 
based on a survey of experts, as was done in the World Health Organisation health 
system efficiency project (see WHO, 2000) or could some form of econometric 
technique be used?  Fourth, should we insist that all countries have the same set of 
weights or should we allow them to differ so as to reflect different priorities in different 
countries (for example, see the analysis of the WHO data by Lauer et al., 2004)?6  Fifth, 
should we include an input measure, such as government expenditure as a share of GDP 
on these activities, so as to produce a measure of the efficiency of the social protection 
system instead of just an output index? 
Finally, on the basis of data covering 10 years, we wish to see if there is any 
convergence in social inclusion indicators. More importantly, we want to check whether 
there is any sign of social dumping. Following the increasing integration of European 
societies, it is feared that social protection might be subject to a “race to the bottom”.7 
As we show convergence is happening and social dumping is not. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we assess the 
performance of 15 European welfare states for the most recent year, using a number of 
social indicators. In section 3 we discuss the issue of performance versus efficiency. In 
section 4 we look at the trend over a period of 10 years. A final section concludes. 
 
                                                          
5 The issues of weights and scaling are of course related. 
6 One could also allow the weights to vary across time periods. 
7 Cremer and Pestieau (2004). 
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2. Constructing an Aggregate Index 
We have selected five indicators among those provided by Eurostat. Our selection was 
based on two concerns: choosing the most relevant data and making sure that they cover 
a sufficient number of years (10) and countries (15). The indicators given in Table 1 
reflect different facets of social exclusion. Table 1 provides also the coefficient of 
correlation among these indicators. The first four indicators POV, INE, UNE and EDU 
are such that we want them as low as possible. EXP (life expectancy) is the only 
"positive" indicator. 
The five indicators listed in Table 1 are measured in different units. Can we normalize 
them in such a way that they are comparable?  The original Human Development 
Report (HDR, 1990) suggested that the n-th indicator (e.g., life expectancy) of the i-th 
country be scaled using 
 *
min{ }
max{ } min{ }
ni nkk
ni
nk nkkk
x x
x
x x
−
= − , (1) 
so that for each indicator the highest score is one and the lowest is zero. For “negative” 
indicators, such as unemployment, where “more is bad”, one could alternatively specify: 
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so that the country with the lowest rate of unemployment will receive a score of one and 
the one with the highest rate of unemployment will receive zero. 
Table 2 gives the normalized indicators for the year 2004, the most recent for which we 
have data. For each indicator, the performance of each country can be assessed relative 
to the best practice (the country with a score of one).  
Not surprisingly the Nordic countries lead the pack for poverty, Sweden for inequality 
and both Denmark and Sweden for education. The UK is first for unemployment and 
Italy for longevity. The worse performers are Portugal for poverty, longevity, education 
and inequality, and Greece for unemployment. 
5 
How can we aggregate these five scaled indicators to obtain an overall assessment of 
social protection performance? One option is to again follow the HDI method and 
calculate the raw arithmetic average: 
 
5
*
1
11
5i nin
SPI x
=
= ∑  (3) 
This has been done and the values obtained are reported in Table 2. As it appears, 
Sweden is the best ranked and Portugal last. More generally, at the top one finds the 
Nordic countries, plus Austria, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and at the bottom the 
Southern countries. 
Given the observed maximum and minimum values in the 2004 data, we can rewrite 
equation (3) as 
 1 2 3 4 521 7.2 5.6 39.4 77.311
5 21 11 7.2 3.3 5.6 1.0 39.4 8.5 80.7 77.3
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 (4) 
Taking first derivatives with respect to 1ix  we obtain: 
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and doing the same for the remaining four indicators we obtain −0.05, −0.04, −0.006 
and 0.06, respectively.  
The ratio of two of these values produces an implicit shadow price ratio 
 1 1 jii i
ni ji ni
xSPI SPI
x x x
∂∂ ∂ =∂ ∂ ∂ . (6) 
For example, taking poverty and unemployment we obtain −0.04/(−0.02)=2. That is, the 
aggregation process implicitly assumes that reducing the long term unemployment rate 
by one percent is worth the same as a reduction in the poverty rate of two percent. Is 
this what we expected this index to do?  What do these relative weights reflect?  Are 
they meant to reflect our social preference function or do they reflect the relative 
quantities of resources (public expenditure) that would be needed to achieve these 
things? 
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One concern with the above approach is that the implicit weights depend upon the 
composition of the sample. For example, if some of the more recent EU member states 
were added to the sample we may find that ranges of some indicators may change and 
hence the relative sizes of the partial derivatives may also change. This could lead to a 
change in rankings for some countries. 
One way to partially, but not fully, address this issue would be to adopt the approach 
used by Afonso et al. (2005) in an international comparison of public sector efficiency. 
They addressed the scaling issue by scaling each indicator by its sample mean. In the 
case of “negative” indicators they inverted them before doing this. This method is likely 
to be more stable because the sample mean is likely to be less sensitive in the face of 
sample expansion, relative to the sample range (i.e., max−min). 
By calculating the means using the 2004 data, we can rewrite equation (3) as 
 5
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i
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Taking first derivatives with respect to 1nx  we obtain: 
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This derivative is not a constant (unlike that in equation 5). It is smaller for larger values 
of the poverty indicator, ceteris paribus. One could argue that this is reasonable since 
the marginal cost of reducing poverty is likely to be large when poverty rates are very 
small. However, one could alternatively argue that the social value of reducing poverty 
in that situation is low. 
This derivative when evaluated at the sample mean is equal to −0.03. Furthermore, for 
the remaining four indicators we obtain −0.04, −0.05, −0.010 and 0.003, respectively. 
The resulting implicit price ratios are not the same as those obtained using the previous 
method. For example, the poverty and unemployment ratio reduces from 2 to 1.67. 
The results of both approaches are reported in Table 2 and Table 3 where we see that 
the choice of indicator does affect rankings for all but three countries (Sweden, Portugal 
7 
and Luxembourg). Most movements are small, although France and Ireland both move 
by three places, which is not insignificant in a table of 15 countries. 
Also reported in Table 4 are an additional set of results. These are derived using a 
method closely related to the HDI approach. The only difference is that instead of using 
the sample minimum and maximums, alternative “goalposts” are used. This method is 
explained in more detail shortly. 
In Table 7, we give the correlation coefficients for several indexes. The correlation 
between SPI1 and SPI2 is equal to 0.894. This indicates strong but not perfect 
correlation between these two indices. 
3. Data Envelopment Analysis 
In the previous section we show that the above two index construction methods use 
implicit weights that one could argue are rather arbitrary. One possible solution to this 
problem is the use of the data envelopment analysis (DEA) method.8  DEA is 
traditionally used to measure the technical efficiency scores of a sample of firms. For 
example, in the case of farming, one would collect data on the inputs and outputs of a 
sample of farms. Output variables could be wheat and beef, while the input variables 
could be land, labour, capital, materials and services. The DEA method involves 
running a sequence of linear programs which fit a production frontier surface over the 
data points, defined by a collection of intersecting hyper-planes. The DEA method 
produces a technical efficiency score for each firm in the sample. This is a value 
between zero and one which reflects the degree to which the firm is near the frontier. A 
value of one indicates that the firm is on the frontier and is fully efficient, while a value 
of 0.8 indicates that the firm is producing 80% of its potential output given the input 
vector it has.9   
In the case of the production of social protection, we could conceptualise a production 
process where each country is a “firm” which uses government resources to produce 
social outputs such as reduced unemployment and longer life expectancies. At this stage 
                                                          
8 For example, see Coelli et al. (2005) for details of the DEA method. 
9 This is known as an output orientated efficiency score. It reflects the degree to which the output vector of the i-th 
firm can be proportionally expanded (with inputs fixed) while still remaining within the feasible production set 
defined by the DEA frontier. One can also define input orientated technical efficiency scores, which relate to the 
degree to which inputs can be contracted (with outputs fixed). 
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of the paper we will assume that each country has one “government” and hence one unit 
of input, and it produces the five outputs discussed above.10   
Given access to data on N inputs and M outputs for each of I countries, a DEA model 
may be specified as11   
 max θ,λ φ 
 st -φqi + Qλ ≥ 0, 
  xi - Xλ ≥ 0, 
  λ ≥ 0, (9) 
where xi is the input vector of the i-th firm; qi, is the output vector of the i-th firm; the 
N×I input matrix, X, and the M×I output matrix, Q, represent the data for all I firms; φ is 
a scalar and λ is a I×1 vector of constants. The value of φ obtained is the inverse of the 
efficiency score for the i-th firm. It satisfies: 1≤φ≤∞, with a value of 1 indicating a point 
on the frontier and hence a technically efficient firm. Note that the linear programming 
problem is solved I times, once for each firm in the sample. A value of φ is then 
obtained for each firm. 
In the event that all firms have a single unit of input, which is the case in our situation, 
the LP in (9) becomes 
 max θ,λ φ 
 st -φqi + Qλ ≥ 0, 
  λ ≥ 0, (10) 
The DEA efficiency scores obtained using the LP in (10), and utilizing the three 
different input scaling methods, are reported in Table 5. A number of observations can 
be made. First, we note that the rankings are quite similar across the three sets of DEA 
results. Second, we observe that in these DEA models approximately 40% of the sample 
receives an efficiency score of one (indicating that they are fully efficient). This is not 
unusual in a DEA analysis where the number of dimensions (variables) is large relative 
to the number of observations. Third, the DEA rankings are “broadly similar” to the 
                                                          
10 Later in this paper we look at the possibility of measuring the input using government expenditure measures. 
11 This is an output oriented constant returns to scale DEA model. See, for example, Färe et al. (1985). 
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index number rankings. However a few countries do experience large changes, such as 
Italy which is ranked 12 or 13 in the index numbers but is found to be fully efficient in 
the DEA results.12   
Why do we observe differences between the rankings in DEA versus the index 
numbers?  There are two primary reasons. First, the index numbers allocate an equal 
weight of 1/5 to each indicator while in the DEA method the weights used can vary 
across the five indicators because they are determined by the slope of the production 
possibility frontier that is constructed using the LP methods. Second, the implicit 
weights (or shadow prices) in DEA can also vary from country to country because the 
slope of the frontier can differ for different output (indicator) mixes.  
The shadow price information produced by DEA can be illustrated by considering the 
dual to the output-oriented DEA LP problem in (9)13 
 minμ,ν (ν′xi), 
 st μ′qi = 1, 
  μ′qj - ν′xj ≤ 0,       j=1,2,...,I, 
  μ, ν ≥ 0, (11) 
where μ is an M×1 vector of output shadow prices and ν is a N×1 vector of input 
shadow prices, which correspond to the M output constraints and N input constraints in 
the primal LP in (9). 14  Once again, this LP is solved I times (once for each country in 
the sample) and the technical efficiency score of the i-th country will be equal to 
μ′qi/ν′xi, which will be identical to the φ obtained using the primal DEA LP (a standard 
duality result in linear programming).15 
If one now considers the case where each country has one unit of a single input, we see 
that the efficiency score becomes μ′qi/ν1, which is a simple linear function of the qi. The 
                                                          
12 The favourable DEA scores for Italy are due primarily to the fact that it has the best life expectancy score in the 
sample, which puts it at the edge of the five-dimensional data space and hence gives it a higher likelihood of being 
found to be efficient because of the convexity of the DEA frontier. 
13 The seminal DEA paper by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) used an input-oriented dual formulation.  
14 See Coelli et al. (2005, ch. 6) for discussion of primal and dual DEA LPs. 
15 Note that there is no need to solve both the primal and dual LPs. The shadow prices can be obtained directly from 
the final solution matrix when the primal LP is solved. 
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elements of μ may be interpreted as normalized shadow prices. Thus the ratio of any 
two elements of μ can be interpreted in the same way as equation (6) above. 
As noted above, the DEA weights can vary from country to country when the output 
mix varies. For example, consider Figure 1 where we illustrate a simple case where 
there are six countries with two output indicators. Countries A, B and C define the 
frontier and hence are fully efficient, while countries D, E and F are inside the frontier 
and hence inefficient. Country F has a technical efficiency score of 0F/0F*=0.7, 
indication that it is producing 70% of its potential output. The slope of the frontier is 
equal to -μ2/μ1. The slope of the line AB is 1 while that of BC is 2. Thus we could say 
that country F (and country E) allocates weights of 0.33 and 0.67 to outputs 1 and 2, 
respectively, while country D allocates equal weights of 0.5 to the two outputs.16 
 
 
Figure 1:  DEA frontier 
 
It is interesting to investigate the degree to which the implicit weights in the DEA 
models differ from the 1/5 weight used in the index numbers. To investigate this we 
                                                          
16 We have scaled the weights so that they add up to one to make the discussion more easily comparable to the index 
numbers above. 
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have used the shadow price information from the dual DEA LP to obtain implicit price 
weights for each country, the means of which are listed in Table 6. The first thing we 
note is that the scaled inequality indicator is given a very small weight in the DEA 
models. This suggests that a one unit reduction in this indicator will lead to minimal 
increases in the other indicators (in terms of movement along the surface of the DEA 
frontier). This may reflect the fact that these countries generally allocate lower priority 
to income inequality versus the other four indicators considered in this analysis. 
Otherwise, with the exception of this inequality indicator, the other weights in the DEA1 
model are quite uniform, all being in the region of 1/4. 
The weights in the DEA2 model however are less uniform, with the life expectancy 
indicator given a large weight of in excess of 0.50. This is likely to be a consequence of 
the fact that it is the only indicator that was not inverted prior to inclusion in the DEA 
model. This observation should serve as a warning to others who may apply data 
transformations to indicators prior to including them in an equal-weighted aggregate 
index calculation. The choice of what transformation to use (in this case inversion 
version linear transformation) can have a substantive effect upon the results obtained. 
It is also interesting to note that the mean efficiency scores differ between the DEA 
models. For example, from a mean of 0.921 for DEA1 to 0.990 for DEA2. 
Unfortunately, the invariance properties of DEA models are not widely recognised. 
Most standard DEA models are invariant to multiplicative scaling but they are generally 
not invariant to additive translation or nonlinear transformations, such as inversion. See 
Lovell and Pastor (1995) for a detailed discussion of scaling and translation invariance 
properties in DEA models.  
The importance of these issues can be illustrated by adjusting the indicator scaling 
methods used in our SPI1 according to the advice provided in Anand and Sen (1994). In 
that paper, the authors note that using in the original HDR (1990) minimum and 
maximum sample values in the scaling process will be problematic when between year 
comparisons are made because the minimum and maximum sample values will differ 
from year to year. They instead suggested the use of “goalpost” values, which reflect 
their assessments of retrospective and prospective limits. For example, they suggest a 
range of 35 to 85 for life expectancy and 0 to 100 for education. Using similar logic to 
12 
theirs we could argue that the ranges for poverty and unemployment should also be 0 to 
100. Identifying a range for the inequality indicator is more difficult. Hence we have 
decided to invert it and multiply it by 100, meaning that it now has a natural range from 
0 (the poorest 20% earn nothing) to 100 (the poorest 20% earn the same amount as the 
richest 20%). 
Using these transformations we have produced the DEA3 results reported in Table 5, 
where we observe that the ranks are quite similar to those obtained using the DEA1 
model but the magnitude of the scores has changed markedly, from a mean score of 
0.921 in DEA1 to 0.992 for the DEA3 model. 
For completeness, we have also used these “goalpost” scaled indicators to construct an 
equal-weighted index that we denote SPI3. These numbers were presented in Table 4. 
One item of note is that the mean score for SPI3 is 0.754, which is much less than the 
mean DEA3 score of 0.992. This discrepancy is due to that fact that SPI3 is measured 
relative to a theoretical ideal where we have no unemployment, no poverty, etc., while 
DEA3 is measured relative to the current observed best practice. 
Given our results, and the fact that the inequality indicator is strongly correlated with 
the poverty indicator (and has a low weight in the DEA models), we also calculated the 
DEA measures of performance with the inequality indicator removed. The results we 
obtain (not reported here) are found to be almost identical to those of Table 5. 
In Table 7 we provide sample correlations across our 6 indicators. One observes 
reasonably strong correlations between all the performance indexes used so far, which is 
reassuring. Thus, in section 5, when we study the evolution of performance over a 
decade, we will focus our attention on one set of indicators: DEA1 and SPI1, without 
the risk of our choice having a large effect on our results. 
4. Measuring efficiency with or without inputs 
In traditional measures of production efficiency of public services or public utilities, we 
gather data on both outputs and inputs and construct a best practice frontier using either 
a parametric (regression) or non-parametric (e.g., DEA) technique. So doing we are able 
to say that if a production unit has a certain degree of inefficiency, it means that it can 
do better with the same quantity of inputs or do as well with less inputs. This approach 
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is very useful and should be used to assess the efficiency of the public sector under two 
key conditions: availability of data and the existence of an underlying technology. For 
example, measuring the efficiency of railways companies with this approach makes 
sense. Railways transport people and commodities (hopefully with comfort and 
punctuality) using a certain number of identifiable inputs. 
When dealing with the public sector as a whole and more particularly social protection, 
one can easily identify its missions: social inclusion in terms of housing, education, 
health, work and consumption. Yet, it is difficult to relate indicators pertaining to these 
missions (e.g., our five indicators) to specific inputs. A number of papers17 use social 
spending as the input, but one has to realize that for most indicators of inclusion, social 
spending explains little. For example, it is well known that for health and education 
factors such as diet and family support are often just as important as public spending. 
This does not mean that public spending in health and in education is worth nothing; it 
just means that it is part of a complex process in which other factors play a crucial and 
complementary role. 
In Table 8, we present the DEA measures using social spending as an input18. The 
results are not surprising. Countries that spend little and had a low performance now 
become the most efficient. This is the case of Ireland and Spain (for DEA1). Can we 
conclude that by spending differently Germany or France would do better? Not 
necessarily. Doing better can be related to matters independent from social programs: a 
better diet, a less stressful life, an increased parental investment in education, a more 
flexible labor market, … For these matters there might be room for public action but not 
in financial terms.  
Does that mean that the financing side does not matter? Not really. It is important to 
make sure that wastes are minimized, but wastes cannot be measured at such an 
aggregate level. As a consequence, indicators such as presented in Table 8 have little 
meaning if any. To evaluate the efficiency slacks of the public sector, it is desirable to 
analyse micro-components of the welfare states such as schools, hospitals, public 
                                                          
17  Alonso et al. (2006, 2005a,b, 2004). 
18  See Table A2 in the appendix for data on social expenditure by country in the period 1995-2004. 
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agencies, public institution, railways, etc.19 20 At the macro level, one should stop short 
of measuring technical inefficiency and restrict oneself to performance ranking. 
To again use the analogy of a classroom, it makes sense to rank students according to 
how they perform in a series of exams. Admittedly one can question the quality of tests 
or the weights used in adding marks from different fields. Yet in general there is little 
discussion as to the grading of students. At the same time we know that these students 
may face different “environmental conditions” which can affect their ability to perform.. 
For example, if we have two students ranked number 1 and 2 and if the latter is forced 
to work at night to help ailing parents or to commute a long way from home, it is 
possible that he can be considered as more deserving or meritorious than the number 1 
whose material and family conditions are ideal. This being said there exists no ranking 
of students according to merit. The concept of “merit” is indeed too controversial. By 
the same token, we should not use social spending as an indicator of the “merit” of 
social protection systems. 
5. Convergence 
Up to now we focused on the year 2004. We now use data on five social indicators 
covering 10 years. It is interesting to see whether or not we observe any trend and 
particularly any convergence. In other words, do we see that countries that didn't fare 
well at the beginning of this ten-year period do progressively catch up? To study that 
evolution, we use our two approaches: average indicator and DEA, but we restrict the 
analysis to the HDI normalization. 
For the average indicator SPI1, we have normalized the primary indicators over the 
whole period. In other words the mark 1 is given to the country and the year that has the 
best indicator (e.g., the lowest poverty rate) and vice-versa for the mark 0. These 
normalized indicators are listed in Table A1 in the appendix. Consider the poverty 
indicator. With the lowest poverty rate we have Sweden in 1995-1999 and Finland in 
1995-1997. Their normalized indicator is thus 1. The highest poverty rate is in Portugal 
in 1995. Summing up these normalized indicators and dividing by 5, we obtain an 
                                                          
19 For example, see Pestieau and Tulkens (1993). 
20  See Ravaillon (2005) for discussion of this issue. 
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average indicator for each country and each year. These are presented in Table 9 and 
Figure 2. 
In Figure 2 it is evident that in all countries (except Sweden) there has been  
a sharp improvement, particularly among the lagging countries: Spain, Ireland and 
Portugal. This seems to indicate some catching up with the best student of the 
“European class”, namely Sweden. To check whether there is convergence, one can 
regress the variation in the indicator at hand, here SPI1, against its value in 1995. The 
results of this regression are presented in Figure 3. As we can see, with a slope 
coefficient of -1.27 and an R2 of 0.8, we have clear convergence.21 
DEA technical efficiency measures for each year are reported in Table 9. Here too we 
can see that many countries with a score below 1 improve over the 10-year period. 
However we have to keep in mind that these DEA technical efficiency measures are 
relative to a best practice frontier that is constructed using data only from the year at 
hand. Hence, movements in this frontier from year to year are not captured by the 
technical efficiency measure.  
In other words, the performance of a country over time can be decomposed in two 
elements. Take two countries A and B, and two years. A is on the frontier in the two 
years, but it is doing better from one year to the other, which means that the frontier 
moves up. We look at the performance of B with respect to that moving best practice 
frontier; we can decompose it into (i) the change in distance with respect to the best 
practice frontier, (ii) the change of the best practice frontier itself. Table 9 is only 
concerned with the first change. 
To decompose the two types of changes, we use a technique that is used in production 
theory. It rests on the Malmquist index that gives the rate at which the frontier moves up 
and the rate at which the distance to the frontier changes over time.22 Table 10 gives the 
yearly changes and the average change. The countries with the lowest average increase 
are the three Nordic countries that are also those with the highest levels. 
                                                          
21 For the SPI and the DEA we have tested the case of convergence for the 3 types of scaling. However we only 
report here the results pertaining to the first type. The other results are available on request. 
22 See Coelli et al. (2005) for details. 
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The indicators presented on Table 10 can be decomposed in a change in the frontier 
(Technical change) and a change in the distance to the frontier (Efficiency change).23 
Those two components are given in Table A3 in the appendix. 
As with the indicator SP11, we wish to check whether or not there is some catching up 
with our DEA1 measure. In Figure 4 we regress average Malmquist measure of 
performance growth against the DEA1 measure in 1995. As we can see, there is 
convergence with a R2 = 0.58. When we only consider the variation in "technical 
efficiency" the convergence appears to be stronger with a R2 = 0.95 as it appears on 
Figure 5. This seems to imply that relative to their own best practice frontier, European 
countries tend to converge unambiguously. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to present some guidelines as to the question of 
measuring the performance of social protection. We believe that such measurement is 
unavoidable for two reasons. First, people constantly compare welfare states on the 
basis of questionable indicators. Second, a good measure can induce national 
governments that are not well ranked to get closer to the best practice frontier. This is 
the spirit of the European OMC (Open Method of Coordination) that has lead to the 
annual publication of indicators of social inclusion for the EU member countries. 
In this paper we propose two approaches: one based on a simple average of partial 
indicators and the other based on Data Envelopment Analysis. The advantage of DEA is 
to provide flexible and endogenous weights for our inclusion indicators. Another issue 
we deal with is that of normalization. We show that our results are somehow sensitive 
to the scaling indicators. We consider three types of scaling and do not have solid 
grounds to prefer one over the other. All of them imply that our two performance 
measures, the sum of partial indicators and the DEA, violate the principle of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives. The three scaling techniques we discuss lead to 
scores that are closely related and for most of the ensuing discussion we use the first 
scaling, that with a range (0,1).  
                                                          
23  The formula is given by Malmquist + 1 = (efficiency change + 1) * (technical change + 1). 
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DEA scores look higher because they are relative to observed best practices and not to a 
theoretical benchmark like the index numbers.  
We then discuss two questions: (i) do we have to limit ourselves to a simple 
performance comparison or can we conduct an efficiency study? (ii) how does our 
performance measure evolves over time? Do we witness any race to the bottom? Even 
though we realize that our performance measures depend on the resources invested by 
the state to finance alternative social protection programs, we deliberately restrict 
ourselves to performance comparison and do not want to calculate efficiency measures 
as it is usually done for micro-units. The reason is simple: the link between public 
spending and most of our inclusion indicators is not clear and does not reveal a clear-cut 
production technology. More concretely, factors that can affect performance are 
missing. For example, climate can affect health and social attitudes can affect education. 
Another finding of our paper is that there appears to be some clear convergence in 
performance among European countries, suggesting that the Open Method of 
Coordination may be achieving its desired outcome. This latter result is pretty 
interesting. There is so much talk of social dumping and race to the bottom that it 
comforting to realize that most countries perform better and in a converging way. 
The fact that even with an enlarged measure of social inclusion the Nordic countries 
lead the pack is not surprising. It is neither surprising to see that Mediterranean 
countries are not doing well. What is surprising is to see that with such an enlarged 
concept Anglo-Saxon welfare states do as well as the Continental welfare states such as 
Germany and France. 
As a final comment let us come back to the selection of social inclusion indicators. The 
gist of this paper is to measure the performance of social protection on the basis of its 
two main objectives: poverty and inequality reduction and protection against lifetime 
risks. If there were no problem with data availability, the indicators we would like to 
use would primarily concern the distribution of individual welfare over the lifecycle and 
across individuals. That ideal measure of welfare would include consumption, 
education, health and employment. Unfortunately, such evidence does not exist for the 
EU15 over a sufficiently long period. Hence, we had to resort to the indicators made 
available in the framework of the OMC. 
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Table 1: Indicators of exclusion. Definitions and correlations 
Definition 
  
POV : At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers as defined as the share of persons with an 
equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of 
the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers). 
  
INE : Inequality of income distribution as defined as the ratio of total income received by the 
20% of the population with the highest income (top quintile) to that received by the 20% of 
the population with the lowest income (lowest quintile). Income must be understood as 
equivalised disposable income. 
  
UNE : Long term unemployed (12 months or longer) as a share of the total active population 
harmonised with national monthly unemployment estimates. 
  
EDU : Early school leavers as the percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at most lower 
secondary education and not in further education or training. 
  
EXP : Life expectancy as the number of years a person may be expected to live, starting at age 0. 
      
Correlation 
 POV INE UNE EDU EXP 
POV 1.000     
INE 0.912 1.000    
UNE 0.420 0.409 1.000   
EDU 0.668 0.782 0.252 1.000  
EXP -0.069 -0.098 0.084 -0.203 1.000 
Source: the five indicators are taken from the Eurostat database on Laeken indicators (2007). 
 
Table 2: HDI normalization and SPI1 - 2004 
 POV INE UNE EDU EXP  SPI1  Rank 
AT 0.80 0.87 0.93 0.99 0.57  0.83  2 
BE 0.60 0.82 0.33 0.89 0.53  0.63  8 
DE 0.50 0.72 0.04 0.88 0.58  0.54  10 
DK 1.00 0.97 0.96 1.00 0.07  0.80  4 
ES 0.10 0.54 0.48 0.25 0.91  0.46  13 
FI 1.00 0.95 0.76 0.99 0.00  0.74  6 
FR 0.70 0.77 0.37 0.82 0.87  0.70  7 
GR 0.10 0.31 0.00 0.79 0.51  0.34  14 
IE 0.00 0.56 0.87 0.86 0.35  0.53  11 
IT 0.20 0.41 0.35 0.55 1.00  0.50  12 
LU 1.00 0.90 0.98 0.86 0.35  0.82  3 
NL 0.90 0.82 0.87 0.82 0.54  0.79  5 
PT 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.00  0.11  15 
SE 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.90  0.97  1 
UK 0.30 0.49 1.00 0.79 0.47  0.61  9 
Mean 0.55 0.68 0.63 0.77 0.51  0.63   
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Table 3: Afonso et al. normalization and SPI2 - 2004 
 POV INE UNE EDU EXP  SPI2  Rank 
AT 1.12 1.14 1.48 1.48 1.00  1.25  4 
BE 0.97 1.09 0.47 1.08 1.00  0.92  9 
DE 0.91 0.99 0.36 1.06 1.00  0.86  11 
DK 1.33 1.28 1.60 1.52 0.98  1.34  2 
ES 0.73 0.85 0.56 0.41 1.02  0.71  14 
FI 1.33 1.24 0.91 1.48 0.98  1.19  5 
FR 1.04 1.04 0.49 0.91 1.02  0.90  10 
GR 0.73 0.72 0.34 0.86 1.00  0.73  12 
IE 0.69 0.87 1.20 1.00 0.99  0.95  8 
IT 0.77 0.78 0.48 0.58 1.02  0.72  13 
LU 1.33 1.17 1.75 1.01 0.99  1.25  3 
NL 1.22 1.09 1.20 0.92 1.00  1.08  6 
PT 0.69 0.60 0.64 0.33 0.98  0.65  15 
SE 1.33 1.32 1.60 1.50 1.02  1.35  1 
UK 0.81 0.82 1.92 0.86 1.00  1.08  7 
Mean 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000   
 
 
Table 4: “Goalpost” normalization and SPI3 - 2004 
 POV INE UNE EDU EXP  SPI3  Rank 
AT 0.870 0.263 0.987 0.913 0.885  0.784  3 
BE 0.850 0.250 0.959 0.881 0.882  0.764  8 
DE 0.840 0.227 0.946 0.879 0.885  0.755  9 
DK 0.890 0.294 0.988 0.915 0.851  0.788  2 
ES 0.800 0.196 0.966 0.683 0.908  0.711  14 
FI 0.890 0.286 0.979 0.913 0.846  0.783  4 
FR 0.860 0.238 0.961 0.858 0.905  0.764  7 
GR 0.800 0.167 0.944 0.851 0.881  0.729  12 
IE 0.790 0.200 0.984 0.871 0.870  0.743  11 
IT 0.810 0.179 0.960 0.777 0.914  0.728  13 
LU 0.890 0.270 0.989 0.873 0.870  0.778  5 
NL 0.880 0.250 0.984 0.860 0.883  0.771  6 
PT 0.790 0.139 0.970 0.606 0.846  0.670  15 
SE 0.890 0.303 0.988 0.914 0.907  0.800  1 
UK 0.820 0.189 0.990 0.851 0.878  0.746  10 
Mean 0.845 0.230 0.973 0.843 0.881  0.754   
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Table 5: DEA efficiency scores. 2004 
 DEA1  DEA2  DEA3  
 Scores rank Scores rank Scores rank 
AT 0.995 7 0.988 9 0.999 7 
BE 0.892 12 0.983 12 0.972 14 
DE 0.886 13 0.984 10 0.975 13 
DK 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
ES 0.939 8 0.997 7 0.996 8 
FI 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
FR 0.937 9 0.997 7 0.995 9 
GR 0.795 14 0.981 13 0.969 15 
IE 0.900 10 0.976 14 0.995 10 
IT 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
LU 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
NL 0.900 10 0.984 10 0.995 10 
PT 0.565 15 0.959 15 0.980 12 
SE 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
UK 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
       
Mean 0.921  0.990  0.992  
Note: DEA1, DEA2 and DEA3 results correspond to HDI, Afonso et al. and “goalspot” normalization 
data respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Means of the DEA implicit weights 
   POV   INE   UNE   EDU     EXP 
DEA1 0.267 0.005 0.237 0.306 0.185 
DEA2 0.215 0.005 0.157 0.057 0.566 
DEA3 0.205 0.067 0.351 0.013 0.364 
 
 
 
Table7: Correlations between indexes 
 SPI1 SPI2 SPI3 DEA1 DEA2 DEA3 
SPI1 1.000      
SPI2 0.894 1.000     
SPI3 0.959 0.883 1.000    
DEA1 0.801 0.643 0.750 1.000   
DEA2 0.669 0.517 0.598 0.903 1.000  
DEA3 0.583 0.576 0.405 0.679 0.656 1.000 
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Table 8: DEA efficiency scores with social expenditures as input. 2004 
 DEA1  DEA2  DEA3  
 Scores rank Scores rank Scores rank 
AT 0.917 8 0.882 6 0.759 7 
BE 0.809 12 0.719 10 0.717 9 
DE 0.769 13 0.635 14 0.625 15 
DK 0.824 11 0.903 5 0.801 5 
ES 1.000 1 0.879 7 0.887 4 
FI 0.943 6 1.000 1 0.895 3 
FR 0.924 7 0.651 13 0.644 14 
GR 0.752 14 0.669 12 0.662 13 
IE 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
IT 0.988 5 0.688 11 0.684 10 
LU 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
NL 0.864 9 0.762 9 0.738 8 
PT 0.444 15 0.676 15 0.683 11 
SE 1.000 1 0.837 8 0.770 6 
UK 0.825 10 0.945 4 0.671 12 
       
Mean 0.871  0.816  0.769  
Note: DEA1, DEA2 and DEA3 results correspond to HDI, Afonso et al. and “goalspot” normalization 
data respectively. 
Table 9: Average indicator (SPI1) and DEA measures (DEA1) - 1995-2004 
 DEA1  SPI1 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
AT 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998 1.000 1.000 0.995 0.979 1.000 1.000  0.694 0.703 0.745 0.764 0.774 0.805 0.817 0.806 0.797 0.813 
BE 0.780 0.928 0.887 0.839 0.869 0.917 0.871 0.894 0.889 0.915  0.532 0.583 0.620 0.610 0.635 0.670 0.699 0.685 0.692 0.699 
DE 0.820 0.932 0.890 0.871 0.882 1.000 0.909 0.894 0.884 0.904  0.578 0.622 0.668 0.697 0.708 0.745 0.753 0.656 0.651 0.646 
DK 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.748 0.733 0.761 0.780 0.783 0.793 0.814 0.796 0.757 0.799 
ES 0.500 0.509 0.457 0.462 0.493 0.590 0.680 0.687 0.701 0.744  0.285 0.328 0.319 0.402 0.435 0.505 0.509 0.538 0.560 0.547 
FI 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.968 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.723 0.734 0.762 0.769 0.753 0.774 0.770 0.783 0.803 0.766 
FR 0.770 0.843 0.833 0.808 0.835 0.866 0.882 0.912 0.913 0.851  0.613 0.628 0.640 0.652 0.660 0.682 0.752 0.771 0.762 0.738 
GR 0.653 0.723 0.706 0.692 0.765 0.776 0.774 0.787 0.840 0.830  0.381 0.403 0.406 0.386 0.402 0.441 0.465 0.445 0.424 0.496 
IE 0.929 0.939 0.976 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.958 0.941 0.942 0.949  0.354 0.386 0.423 0.461 0.506 0.537 0.568 0.578 0.590 0.599 
IT 0.459 0.459 0.470 0.520 0.571 0.609 0.592 0.585 0.613 0.686  0.350 0.372 0.417 0.462 0.493 0.530 0.531 0.539 0.540 0.583 
LU 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.602 0.617 0.667 0.683 0.721 0.760 0.749 0.769 0.800 0.802 
NL 0.869 0.850 0.956 0.989 0.979 0.996 1.000 1.000 0.990 0.948  0.676 0.657 0.756 0.775 0.760 0.758 0.778 0.781 0.770 0.782 
PT 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.976 1.000 0.969 0.938 1.000  0.178 0.234 0.235 0.246 0.291 0.323 0.340 0.306 0.331 0.298 
SE 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.882 0.884 0.890 0.886 0.917 0.873 0.905 0.884 0.901 0.905 
UK 0.788 0.811 0.849 0.909 0.921 0.928 0.935 0.961 0.979 1.000  0.403 0.470 0.522 0.518 0.541 0.572 0.589 0.592 0.617 0.643 
 
 Table 10: Malmquist indices 
 1995-
1996 
1996-
1997 
1997-
1998 
1998-
1999 
1999-
2000 
2000-
2001 
2001-
2002 
2002-
2003 
2003-
2004 Average 
AT -1.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.8% 1.2% 0.9% -1.1% -0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
BE 5.4% 0.0% -5.4% -2.0% 5.4% -3.8% 3.7% -1.4% 2.7% 0.4% 
DE -0.4% -0.8% -2.5% -1.0% 7.3% -6.2% -5.8% -1.4% 1.8% -1.1% 
DK -6.6% -1.3% -2.8% -1.3% -2.8% 1.2% -3.6% -3.8% -0.6% -2.4% 
ES -3.2% -11.5% -1.7% 5.4% 19.1% 15.3% 0.0% 0.0% 4.4% 2.7% 
FI -0.8% 1.6% -2.8% -4.9% 0.9% -2.7% 0.6% 0.8% 2.1% -0.6% 
FR 0.8% 0.9% -2.2% 0.9% 2.9% 0.4% 2.3% 0.6% -7.2% -0.1% 
GR 1.4% 0.9% -1.5% 4.8% 1.2% 2.5% 2.8% 3.8% -0.5% 1.7% 
IE -3.8% -2.1% -3.2% 3.0% -6.0% -10.1% -4.2% -1.7% -0.4% -3.2% 
IT -6.0% 0.5% 8.5% 9.8% 4.2% -0.4% -4.2% 3.7% 11.5% 2.9% 
LU 0.7% -0.3% -0.3% 1.7% 1.3% -0.2% -1.0% 3.2% -4.5% 0.0% 
NL -2.5% 13.7% 4.9% 0.5% 3.6% 1.5% -0.9% -2.8% -6.0% 1.2% 
PT 1.3% -6.1% -4.3% -2.0% -7.2% -5.4% -7.5% -3.2% 2.9% -3.5% 
SE -0.5% -0.5% -1.2% 1.9% -5.7% 1.8% -8.0% -0.4% -0.5% -1.5% 
UK 1.6% 4.6% 7.4% 2.3% 2.0% 0.6% 1.8% -0.2% 0.7% 2.3% 
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Figure 2: Average indicator SPI1 1995-2004 
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Figure 3: Convergence of SPI1 
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Figure 4: Convergence of DEA1 according to Malmquists change 
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Figure 5: Convergence of DEA1 according to “technical efficiency” change 
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Appendix 
 
Table A2: Social spending 
 Social spending as a % of GDP 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
AT 28.7 28.6 28.6 28.3 28.7 28.2 28.6 29.1 29.5 29.1 
BE 27.4 28 27.4 27.1 27 26.5 27.3 28 29.1 29.3 
DE 28.2 29.3 28.9 28.8 29.2 29.2 29.3 29.9 30.2 30.7 
DK 31.9 31.2 30.1 30 29.8 28.9 29.2 29.7 30.7 30.7 
ES 21.6 21.5 20.8 20.2 19.8 19.7 19.5 19.8 19.9 20 
FI 31.5 31.4 29.1 27 26.2 25.1 24.9 25.6 26.5 26.7 
FR 30.3 30.6 30.4 30 29.9 29.5 29.6 30.4 30.9 31.2 
GR 22.3 22.9 23.3 24.2 25.5 25.7 26.7 26.2 26 26 
IE 18.8 17.6 16.4 15.2 14.6 14.1 15 16 16.5 17 
IT 24.2 24.3 24.9 24.6 24.8 24.7 24.9 25.3 25.8 26.1 
LU 20.7 21.2 21.5 21.2 20.5 19.6 20.8 21.4 22.2 22.6 
NL 30.6 29.6 28.7 27.8 27.1 26.4 26.5 27.6 28.3 28.5 
PT 21 20.2 20.3 20.9 21.4 21.7 22.7 23.7 24.2 24.9 
SE 34.3 33.6 32.7 32 31.7 30.7 31.3 32.3 33.3 32.9 
UK 28.2 28 27.5 26.9 26.4 27.1 27.5 26.4 26.4 26.3 
Source: Eurostat (2007). 
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Table A1: Social cohesion indicators 
 Primary indicators  HDR normalization 
 POV INE UNE EDU EXP  POV INE UNE EDU EXP 
 1995 
AT 13 4.0 1.0 13.6 76.7 0.67 0.76 0.96 0.81 0.73 
BE 16 4.5 5.8 15.1 76.9 0.47 0.64 0.46 0.78 0.69 
DE 15 4.6 3.9 13.5 76.6 0.53 0.62 0.66 0.82 0.75 
DK 10 2.9 2.0 6.1 75.3 0.87 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.98 
ES 19 5.9 10.3 33.8 78.0 0.27 0.33 0.00 0.32 0.49 
FI 8 3.0 5.3 11.5 76.6 1.00 0.98 0.52 0.87 0.75 
FR 15 4.5 4.4 15.4 78.0 0.53 0.64 0.61 0.77 0.49 
GR 22 6.5 4.6 22.4 77.7 0.07 0.20 0.59 0.60 0.55 
IE 19 5.1 7.6 21.4 75.7 0.27 0.51 0.28 0.62 0.91 
IT 20 5.9 7.1 32.8 78.2 0.20 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.45 
LU 12 4.3 0.7 33.4 76.7 0.73 0.69 0.99 0.33 0.73 
NL 11 4.2 3.1 18.0 77.5 0.80 0.71 0.74 0.71 0.58 
PT 23 7.4 3.1 41.4 75.3 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.13 0.98 
SE 8 3.0 2.3 8.0 78.8 1.00 0.98 0.82 0.95 0.35 
UK 20 5.2 3.5 32.3 76.7 0.20 0.49 0.70 0.35 0.73 
 1996 
AT 14 3.8 1.2 12.1 77.0 0.60 0.80 0.94 0.85 0.67 
BE 15 4.2 5.7 12.9 77.2 0.53 0.71 0.47 0.83 0.64 
DE 14 4.0 4.1 13.3 76.8 0.60 0.76 0.64 0.82 0.71 
DK 10 3.0 1.8 12.1 75.7 0.87 0.98 0.88 0.85 0.91 
ES 18 6.0 9.4 31.4 78.1 0.33 0.31 0.09 0.38 0.47 
FI 8 3.0 5.2 11.1 76.8 1.00 0.98 0.53 0.88 0.71 
FR 15 4.3 4.5 15.2 78.2 0.53 0.69 0.60 0.78 0.45 
GR 21 6.3 5.2 20.7 77.8 0.13 0.24 0.53 0.64 0.53 
IE 19 5.1 7.0 18.9 75.9 0.27 0.51 0.34 0.68 0.87 
IT 20 5.6 7.3 31.7 78.4 0.20 0.40 0.31 0.37 0.42 
LU 11 4.0 0.8 35.3 76.7 0.80 0.76 0.98 0.28 0.73 
NL 12 4.4 3.0 17.6 77.5 0.73 0.67 0.75 0.72 0.58 
PT 21 6.7 3.3 40.1 75.2 0.13 0.16 0.72 0.16 1.00 
SE 8 3.0 2.7 7.5 79.0 1.00 0.98 0.78 0.97 0.31 
UK 18 5.0 3.1 29.2 76.9 0.33 0.53 0.74 0.43 0.69 
 1997 
AT 13 3.6 1.3 10.8 77.4 0.67 0.84 0.93 0.88 0.60 
BE 14 4.0 5.4 12.7 77.4 0.60 0.76 0.51 0.84 0.60 
DE 12 3.7 4.6 12.9 77.2 0.73 0.82 0.59 0.83 0.64 
DK 10 2.9 1.5 10.7 76.0 0.87 1.00 0.91 0.89 0.85 
ES 20 6.5 8.7 30.0 78.6 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.41 0.38 
FI 8 3.0 4.9 8.1 77.0 1.00 0.98 0.56 0.95 0.67 
FR 15 4.4 4.7 14.1 78.6 0.53 0.67 0.58 0.80 0.38 
GR 21 6.6 5.3 19.9 78.2 0.13 0.18 0.52 0.66 0.45 
IE 19 5.0 5.6 18.9 76.0 0.27 0.53 0.48 0.68 0.85 
IT 19 5.3 7.3 30.1 78.7 0.27 0.47 0.31 0.41 0.36 
LU 11 3.6 0.9 30.7 77.0 0.80 0.84 0.97 0.39 0.67 
NL 10 3.6 2.3 16.0 77.9 0.87 0.84 0.82 0.76 0.51 
PT 22 6.7 3.2 40.6 75.6 0.07 0.16 0.73 0.15 0.93 
SE 8 3.0 3.1 6.8 79.3 1.00 0.98 0.74 0.98 0.25 
UK 18 4.7 2.5 26.0 77.2 0.33 0.60 0.80 0.51 0.64 
 1998 
AT 13 3.5 1.3 10.7 77.8 0.67 0.87 0.93 0.89 0.53 
BE 14 4.0 5.6 14.5 77.5 0.60 0.76 0.48 0.79 0.58 
DE 11 3.6 4.5 13.9 77.6 0.80 0.84 0.60 0.81 0.56 
DK 10 3.0 1.3 9.8 76.4 0.87 0.98 0.93 0.91 0.78 
ES 18 5.9 7.5 29.6 78.7 0.33 0.33 0.29 0.42 0.36 
FI 9 3.1 4.1 7.9 77.2 0.93 0.96 0.64 0.96 0.64 
FR 15 4.2 4.5 14.9 78.7 0.53 0.71 0.60 0.78 0.36 
GR 21 6.5 5.8 20.7 77.9 0.13 0.20 0.46 0.64 0.51 
IE 19 5.2 3.9 18.0 76.2 0.27 0.49 0.66 0.71 0.82 
IT 18 5.1 6.8 28.4 78.8 0.33 0.51 0.36 0.45 0.35 
LU 12 3.7 0.9 25.2 77.2 0.73 0.82 0.97 0.53 0.64 
30 
 Primary indicators  HDR normalization 
 POV INE UNE EDU EXP  POV INE UNE EDU EXP 
NL 10 3.6 1.5 15.5 77.9 0.87 0.84 0.91 0.77 0.51 
PT 21 6.8 2.2 46.6 75.9 0.13 0.13 0.84 0.00 0.87 
SE 8 3.4 2.6 6.9 79.4 1.00 0.89 0.79 0.98 0.24 
UK 19 5.2 1.9 22.9 77.3 0.27 0.49 0.87 0.59 0.62 
 1999 
AT 12 3.7 1.2 10.7 77.9 0.73 0.82 0.94 0.89 0.51 
BE 13 4.2 4.8 15.2 77.7 0.67 0.71 0.57 0.78 0.55 
DE 11 3.6 4.1 14.9 77.8 0.80 0.84 0.64 0.78 0.53 
DK 10 3.0 1.1 11.5 76.6 0.87 0.98 0.95 0.87 0.75 
ES 19 5.7 5.7 29.5 78.7 0.27 0.38 0.47 0.42 0.36 
FI 11 3.4 3.0 9.9 77.5 0.80 0.89 0.75 0.91 0.58 
FR 15 4.4 4.1 14.7 78.9 0.53 0.67 0.64 0.79 0.33 
GR 21 6.2 6.5 18.6 78.1 0.13 0.27 0.39 0.69 0.47 
IE 19 4.9 2.4 17.1 76.1 0.27 0.56 0.81 0.73 0.84 
IT 18 4.9 6.7 27.2 79.2 0.33 0.56 0.37 0.48 0.27 
LU 13 3.9 0.7 19.1 77.9 0.67 0.78 0.99 0.68 0.51 
NL 11 3.7 1.2 16.2 77.9 0.80 0.82 0.94 0.75 0.51 
PT 21 6.4 1.8 44.9 76.2 0.13 0.22 0.88 0.04 0.82 
SE 8 3.1 1.9 6.9 79.5 1.00 0.96 0.87 0.98 0.22 
UK 19 5.2 1.7 19.7 77.4 0.27 0.49 0.89 0.66 0.60 
 2000 
AT 12 3.4 1.0 10.2 78.2 0.73 0.89 0.96 0.90 0.45 
BE 13 4.3 3.7 12.5 77.8 0.67 0.69 0.68 0.84 0.53 
DE 10 3.5 3.7 14.9 78.1 0.87 0.87 0.68 0.78 0.47 
DK 10 3.1 0.9 11.6 76.9 0.87 0.96 0.97 0.86 0.69 
ES 18 5.4 4.6 29.1 79.2 0.33 0.44 0.59 0.43 0.27 
FI 11 3.3 2.8 8.9 77.7 0.80 0.91 0.77 0.93 0.55 
FR 16 4.2 3.5 13.3 79.1 0.47 0.71 0.70 0.82 0.29 
GR 20 5.8 6.2 18.2 78.1 0.20 0.36 0.42 0.70 0.47 
IE 20 4.7 1.6 16.2 76.5 0.20 0.60 0.90 0.75 0.76 
IT 18 4.8 6.3 25.3 79.6 0.33 0.58 0.41 0.53 0.20 
LU 12 3.7 0.6 16.8 78.0 0.73 0.82 1.00 0.74 0.49 
NL 11 4.1 0.8 15.5 78.0 0.80 0.73 0.98 0.77 0.49 
PT 21 6.4 1.7 42.6 76.7 0.13 0.22 0.89 0.10 0.73 
SE 11 3.5 1.4 7.7 79.7 0.80 0.87 0.92 0.96 0.18 
UK 19 5.2 1.4 18.4 77.9 0.27 0.49 0.92 0.70 0.51 
 2001 
AT 12 3.5 0.9 10.2 78.6 0.73 0.87 0.97 0.90 0.38 
BE 13 4 3.2 13.6 78.1 0.67 0.76 0.73 0.81 0.47 
DE 11 3.6 3.7 12.5 78.5 0.80 0.84 0.68 0.84 0.40 
DK 10 3 0.9 9.0 77.0 0.87 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.67 
ES 19 5.5 3.7 29.2 79.3 0.27 0.42 0.68 0.43 0.25 
FI 11 3.7 2.5 10.3 78.1 0.80 0.82 0.80 0.90 0.47 
FR 13 3.9 3.0 13.5 79.3 0.67 0.78 0.75 0.82 0.25 
GR 20 5.7 5.5 17.3 78.1 0.20 0.38 0.49 0.72 0.47 
IE 21 4.5 1.3 15.3 77.2 0.13 0.64 0.93 0.77 0.64 
IT 19 4.8 5.7 26.4 79.8 0.27 0.58 0.47 0.50 0.16 
LU 12 3.8 0.6 18.1 78.0 0.73 0.80 1.00 0.70 0.49 
NL 11 4 0.6 15.3 78.3 0.80 0.76 1.00 0.77 0.44 
PT 20 6.5 1.5 44.0 77.0 0.20 0.20 0.91 0.06 0.67 
SE 9 3.4 1.0 10.5 79.9 0.93 0.89 0.96 0.89 0.15 
UK 18 5.4 1.3 17.7 78.1 0.33 0.44 0.93 0.71 0.47 
 2002 
AT 12.5 3.75 1.1 9.5 78.8 0.70 0.81 0.95 0.92 0.35 
BE 14 4 3.7 12.4 78.2 0.60 0.76 0.68 0.84 0.45 
DE 15 4.4 3.9 12.6 78.4 0.53 0.67 0.66 0.84 0.42 
DK 11 3.3 0.9 8.6 77.2 0.80 0.91 0.97 0.94 0.64 
ES 19 5.1 3.7 29.9 79.7 0.27 0.51 0.68 0.41 0.18 
FI 11 3.7 2.3 9.9 78.3 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.91 0.44 
FR 12 3.9 3.1 13.4 79.5 0.73 0.78 0.74 0.82 0.22 
GR 20.5 6.15 5.3 16.7 78.1 0.17 0.28 0.52 0.74 0.47 
IE 21 4.8 1.4 14.7 77.8 0.13 0.58 0.92 0.79 0.53 
IT 19 5.2 5.1 24.3 79.9 0.27 0.49 0.54 0.55 0.15 
LU 11 3.9 0.7 17 78.2 0.80 0.78 0.99 0.73 0.45 
31 
 Primary indicators  HDR normalization 
 POV INE UNE EDU EXP  POV INE UNE EDU EXP 
NL 11 4 0.7 15 78.4 0.80 0.76 0.99 0.78 0.42 
PT 20 7.3 1.7 45.1 77.3 0.20 0.02 0.89 0.04 0.62 
SE 11 3.3 1 10.4 79.9 0.80 0.91 0.96 0.89 0.15 
UK 18 5.5 1.1 17.8 78.2 0.33 0.42 0.95 0.71 0.45 
 2003 
AT 13 4 1.1 9.3 79.0 0.67 0.76 0.95 0.92 0.31 
BE 15 4 3.7 12.8 78.8 0.53 0.76 0.68 0.83 0.35 
DE 15 4.3 4.5 12.8 78.5 0.53 0.69 0.60 0.83 0.40 
DK 12 3.6 1.1 10.3 77.2 0.73 0.84 0.95 0.90 0.64 
ES 19 5.1 3.7 31.3 80.5 0.27 0.51 0.68 0.38 0.04 
FI 11 3.6 2.3 8.3 78.5 0.80 0.84 0.82 0.95 0.40 
FR 12 3.8 3.7 13.7 79.5 0.73 0.80 0.68 0.81 0.22 
GR 21 6.6 5.3 15.5 78.1 0.13 0.18 0.52 0.77 0.47 
IE 21 5.1 1.6 12.3 78.3 0.13 0.51 0.90 0.85 0.44 
IT 19 5.2 4.9 23.5 79.7 0.27 0.49 0.56 0.57 0.18 
LU 10 4 0.9 12.3 78.3 0.87 0.76 0.97 0.85 0.44 
NL 12 4 1 14.2 78.5 0.73 0.76 0.96 0.80 0.40 
PT 19 7.4 2.2 40.4 77.4 0.27 0.00 0.84 0.15 0.60 
SE 11 3.3 1 9 80.2 0.80 0.91 0.96 0.93 0.09 
UK 18 5.3 1.1 16.8 78.5 0.33 0.47 0.95 0.74 0.40 
 2004 
AT 13 3.8 1.3 8.7 79.3 0.67 0.80 0.93 0.94 0.26 
BE 15 4 4.1 11.9 79.1 0.53 0.76 0.64 0.86 0.29 
DE 16 4.4 5.4 12.1 79.3 0.47 0.67 0.51 0.85 0.26 
DK 11 3.4 1.2 8.5 77.6 0.80 0.89 0.94 0.94 0.57 
ES 20 5.1 3.4 31.7 80.4 0.20 0.51 0.71 0.37 0.05 
FI 11 3.5 2.1 8.7 77.3 0.80 0.87 0.85 0.94 0.62 
FR 14 4.2 3.9 14.2 80.3 0.60 0.71 0.66 0.80 0.08 
GR 20 6 5.6 14.9 79.1 0.20 0.31 0.48 0.78 0.30 
IE 21 5 1.6 12.9 78.5 0.13 0.53 0.90 0.83 0.40 
IT 19 5.6 4 22.3 80.7 0.27 0.40 0.65 0.60 0.00 
LU 11 3.7 1.1 12.7 78.5 0.80 0.82 0.95 0.84 0.40 
NL 12 4 1.6 14 79.2 0.73 0.76 0.90 0.80 0.28 
PT 21 7.2 3 39.4 77.3 0.13 0.04 0.75 0.18 0.62 
SE 11 3.3 1.2 8.6 80.4 0.80 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.06 
UK 18 5.3 1 14.9 78.9 0.33 0.47 0.96 0.78 0.33 
Source: Eurostat Laeken Indicators. Income and Living Conditions Database (2007). 
 
 Table A3: Malmquist decomposition 
1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 
 Eff. change 
Tech. 
change 
Eff. 
change 
Tech. 
change 
Eff. 
change 
Tech. 
change 
Eff. 
change 
Tech. 
change 
Eff. 
change 
Tech. 
change 
Eff. 
change 
Tech. 
change 
Eff. 
change 
Tech. 
change 
Eff. 
change 
Tech. 
change 
Eff. 
change 
Tech. 
change 
AT 0.0% -2.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% -0.5% 1.0% -1.6% 0.0% 2.1% -3.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
BE 19.0% -12.0% -4.5% 4.0% -5.4% -1.0% 3.6% -6.0% 5.5% -1.0% -5.0% 1.0% 2.6% 1.0% -0.5% -1.0% 2.9% -1.0% 
DE 13.7% -13.0% -4.5% 3.0% -2.1% -1.0% 1.3% -3.0% 13.3% -6.0% -9.1% 3.0% -1.7% -5.0% -1.1% -1.0% 2.3% -1.0% 
DK 0.0% -7.0% 0.0% -2.0% 0.0% -3.0% 0.0% -2.0% 0.0% -3.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% -4.0% 0.0% -4.0% 0.0% -1.0% 
ES 1.8% -5.0% -10.1% -2.0% 0.9% -3.0% 6.8% -2.0% 19.7% -1.0% 15.3% 0.0% 1.0% -1.0% 2.1% -2.0% 6.2% -2.0% 
FI 0.0% -1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% -3.0% 0.0% -5.0% 0.0% 0.0% -3.2% 0.0% 3.3% -3.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 
FR 9.5% -8.0% -1.2% 2.0% -3.1% 0.0% 3.4% -3.0% 3.6% -1.0% 1.9% -2.0% 3.5% -2.0% 0.1% 0.0% -6.8% -1.0% 
GR 10.6% -9.0% -2.3% 3.0% -2.1% 0.0% 10.6% -6.0% 1.4% -1.0% -0.2% 2.0% 1.7% 1.0% 6.7% -3.0% -1.2% 0.0% 
IE 1.1% -5.0% 3.9% -6.0% 2.5% -6.0% 0.0% 3.0% 0.0% -6.0% -4.2% -7.0% -1.9% -3.0% 0.2% -2.0% 0.7% -2.0% 
IT -0.1% -6.0% 2.5% -2.0% 10.7% -2.0% 9.8% 0.0% 6.6% -3.0% -2.8% 2.0% -1.1% -4.0% 4.7% -1.0% 11.9% -1.0% 
LU 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -1.0% 0.0% -1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% -1.0% 0.0% -1.0% 0.0% 3.0% 0.0% -5.0% 
NL -2.3% -1.0% 12.5% 1.0% 3.5% 1.0% -1.1% 1.0% 1.7% 1.0% 0.4% 1.0% 0.0% -1.0% -1.0% -2.0% -4.3% -2.0% 
PT 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% -7.0% 0.0% -5.0% 0.0% -2.0% -2.4% -5.0% 2.5% -8.0% -3.1% -5.0% -3.2% 0.0% 6.7% -4.0% 
SE 0.0% -1.0% 0.0% -1.0% 0.0% -2.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% -6.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% -8.0% 0.0% -1.0% 0.0% -1.0% 
UK 2.9% -2.0% 4.7% -1.0% 7.0% 0.0% 1.3% 1.0% 0.8% 1.0% 0.7% 0.0% 2.9% -1.0% 1.9% -2.0% 2.1% -2.0% 
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